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Abstract: Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are placed in open environments 
for the collection of data and are vulnerable to external and internal attacks. The 
cryptographic mechanisms implemented so far, such as authorization and 
authentication, are used to restrict external sensor node attacks but cannot 
prevent internal node attacks. In order to evade internal attacks trust mechanisms 
are used. In trust mechanisms, firstly, the sensor nodes are monitored using the 
popular Watchdog mechanism. However, traditional trust models do not pay 
much attention to selective forwarding and consecutive packet dropping. 
Sometimes, sensitive data are dropped by internal attackers. This problem is 
addressed in our proposed model by detecting selective forwarding and 
consecutive failure of sending packets using the Beta probability density 
function model. 
Keywords: beta distribution mathematical model; consecutive failure; internal attacks; 
selfish nodes; wireless sensor network. 
1 Introduction 
Some well-known security techniques that are practiced in wireless sensor 
networks are integrity, confidentiality, availability, and authentication. The most 
common attacks in WSN can be divided into two categories, namely internal 
attacks and external attacks. Cheng, et al. [1] state that external attacks are 
initiated by sensor nodes that do not belong to the network, whereas internal 
attacks are triggered by nodes of the network itself by dropping data or control 
packets, and alter or misroute data packets. Usually, cryptographic mechanisms 
are used to prevent external attacks. However, these cannot completely prevent 
internal attacks, which can cause major problems in life-critical applications 
like robotic surgery, autonomous vehicles, etc. 
Trust helps to overcome several problems that occur in unattended open 
heterogeneous environments. Trust management works with several 
components combined together to calculate the trust of a particular sensor node: 
1. Collecting information by monitoring 
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2. Calculating the trust value based on the collected information  
3. Decision-making based on the calculated trust value 
4. Updating the information to all other nodes 
Every sensor node in the network is watched by the well-known Watchdog 
mechanism, tracking certain node parameters, such as packet forwarding count 
and packet dropping count towards the sink node. 
The Entropy trust model and the Bayesian trust model are two well-known trust 
models used to calculate the trust of sensor nodes by means of the information 
collected by the Watchdog mechanism, as specified by Che, et al. [2]. Then, the 
calculated trust value is compared with an estimated threshold to be able to 
identify internal attacks. When selfish node behavior is detected, every node 
first checks the trust value of its neighboring nodes to find a trusted path to use 
for sending further packets. 
In the presence of environmental changes, a WSN as depicted in Figure 1 is 
prone to dropping packets. This is convenient for attackers who aim to drop 
packets intentionally. In the case of such internal attacks it is hard for any 
defending mechanism to determine whether the packets were dropped because 
of environmental conditions such as noise, contention, or an internal attacker. 
Suppose packets were dropped by an internal attacker only for a short amount 
of time. When the node behaves normally again, this activity cannot be 
classified as trusted or untrusted by traditional trust mechanisms. In this kind of 
scenario it is difficult to fully protect against internal attacks.  
Ad-hoc networks, eCommerce feedback and peer-to-peer networks are some of 
the network environments where trust plays a vital role. The Beta trust model 
gives good results in such networks, where the trust of each node is adjusted by 
considering direct information and indirect (second-hand/recommendation) 
information. This indirect information can be used for faster manipulation of the 
trust values of the nodes in a mobile node environment. 
 
Figure 1 Structure of wireless sensor networks. 
Sensor Node 
Base 
Station Sink Node 
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2 Related Work 
Marti, et al. [3] presented mitigation of routing misbehavior in MANET, exami-
ning two new techniques, Watchdog and Path Rater, to identify changing 
behavior in ad-hoc nodes. They achieved good improvement in efficiency and 
accuracy by optimizing various parameters such as overhead in transmission. In 
the experiment, misbehaving nodes were identified using the Dynamic Source 
Routing Protocol. Varshney, et al. [4] implemented the Watchdog protocol over 
Adhoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) in a mobile ad-hoc network, 
mainly to identify black hole attacks in MANET. Their method, called 
Watchdog-AODV, establishes a new route to send further packets. The 
simulation results showed improvisation in packet delivery, throughput and 
routing overhead. 
Ammendola, et al. [5] have proposed a hierarchical watchdog method for 
finding systemic faults in a distributed environment. This mechanism can 
rapidly identify fake nodes by visualizing the global state of the system. The 
proposed method fixes single-point failures in distributed environments as a 
solution for the fake node problem through double diagnostic messages 
(systemic resilience). Liu, et al. [6] have demonstrated reliability oriented trans-
mission in WSNs, addressing problems such as low success rates and poor 
energy efficiency in a scalable network. They developed a proliferation routing 
scheme that combines three different components, i.e. random disperse, 
reproduction and a path rater scheme that depends on the capability of the 
network. The results showed good improvisation performance (around 80%) 
with a hop-based routing protocol. 
Shen, et al. [7] have proposed an evolutionary game-based theoretical approach. 
They used game theory to develop a method for making decisions to check 
whether a node can be trusted or not. Incentives are provided for the trusted 
nodes. A simulation showed stability and enhanced security for the network 
using this approach. Sun, et al. [8] introduced a novel trust aware routing 
protocol for WSNs and examined multiple attributes of each sensor node 
towards energy, recommendation, data and communication. The authors 
integrated routing and maintenance through a sliding time window scheme in a 
scalable environment. The experimental results revealed 19% improvement in 
packet delivery and 11% improvisation in time consumption in routing. 
Ishmanov, et al. [9] have proposed a new trust mechanism for secure routing in 
WSNs based on energy consumption and attack resiliency. They analyzed 
various trust-aware routing protocols to find the best solution. The mechanism 
consists of three components to overcome the shortcomings of existing models: 
(i) monitoring and learning, (ii) trust evaluation, and (iii) recommendation 
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management. Meng, et al. [10] proposed a Bayesian interference based system 
to defend against insider attacks, focusing on leakage of sensitive information 
by misbehaving nodes. The efficiency of the proposed model in identifying 
malicious sensor nodes in a real-world environment was demonstrated. 
Alsaedi, et al. [11] have proposed a mechanism based on energy trust in a 
clustered WSN to identify Sybil attacks. It minimizes the communication 
overhead with a data aggregation policy. The results showed that this method 
has an efficient and robust detection ratio in identifying Sybil attacks. Also, this 
method removes the exchange of feedback between sensor nodes. Li W, et al. 
[12] and Lin [13] have developed a system to prevent complex attacks and 
betrayal attacks by enhancing identification accuracy. The authors designed a 
sensitivity aware intrusion detection system. In the experiment, various 
classifications were compared to examine the correctness of the proposed 
model. 
3 Packet Transfer and Attack Types 
The data sensed from the environment are transmitted to a sink node through 
single-hop or multi-hop communication. In single-hop communication, packets 
are usually directly transmitted to a sink node in one hop. However, sink nodes 
must be placed within the range of the transmitting node and in this type of 
communication the energy required for transmission is quite high. As described 
in Farooq, et al. [14], multi-hop communication is better suited for energy 
constrained devices. In multi-hop communication, the sensor node depends on a 
neighboring node for transmitting the packets to the sink node. Before 
forwarding a packet, the corresponding trust value of each node is checked. For 
collecting the evidence to compute the trust value, every node is equipped with 
a Watchdog mechanism. Marti, et al. [3] proposed a basic Watchdog 
mechanism in a dynamic sourcing routing protocol for nodes to monitor each 
other to check whether transferred packets are forwarded by the neighboring 
nodes.  
 
Figure 2 Packet forwarding and monitoring process. 
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Referring to Figure 2, assume that Node 1 forwards a packet to Node 2, where 
every node is equipped with the Watchdog mechanism. After transmitting the 
packet to Node 2, Node 1 keeps a copy of it in its buffer for the purpose of 
retransmission and conformity checking. As soon as packet delivery at Node 3 
is confirmed, Node 1 discards the packet from its buffer and counts it as 
successful transmission. Node 1 senses this packet forwarding since Node 3 is 
within the range of Node 1. If time-out occurs, the transaction is counted as 
failed transmission.  
Packet dropping attacks are categorized into three types: black hole attacks, 
which drop both control packets (routing packets) and data packets (payload); 
the second type are gray-hole attacks, which drop only certain packets; and the 
third type are on-off behavior attacks, which show dynamic behavior. These 
attacks are difficult to detect because it is hard to distinguish whether the 
packets are dropped by an attacker or because of heavy traffic in the network 
(network congestion). 
4 Preventive Mechanisms 
Every node in the network works in promiscuous mode, probing the other nodes 
in the network for security purposes. Figure 3 shows the node-to-node 
communication within the network, the node communication range, and 
malicious nodes. The trust value is manipulated based on the number of 
successful transactions and the number of failed transactions. Later, the trust 
value is calculated by another component of the mechanism. The packet 
forwarding mechanism is monitored by the Watchdog mechanism and the 
evidence is collected as successful and failed transmission counter values. Later, 
these counter values are used by another component of the mechanism to detect 
internal attackers. 
Various trust modules and models have been used in previous studies to 
manipulate the trustworthiness of each node in a network. Some of the trust 
models used are: Beta model, fuzzy model, game-based approach, Bayesian 
trust model, and Entropy trust model. Among these models, the Beta model has 
some weaknesses toward internal packet dropping since it fails to address 
continuous or consecutive failures (continuous dropping of packets). This 
consecutive dropping of packets is detected by giving a penalty if the number of 
dropped packets falls under a given threshold. Also, if this consecutive dropping 
of packets is launched after gaining maximum trust value, this poses a very 
serious problem, leading to network partition. Meanwhile, packet droppers can 
only be detected only after dropping a certain number of packets, depending on 
a threshold value. This is taken as the core problem and is handled by 
preprocessing the collected evidence in order to detect packet droppers earlier. 
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The algorithm for preprocessing the evidence collected from the Watchdog 
mechanism is given below. 
1. Begin 
2. 𝑁 ← 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑁𝑆𝑁𝑆 
3. 𝑛𝑆𝑁𝑆1,𝑛𝑆𝑁𝑆2, ….. ,𝑛𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑚 are the neighboring nodes of N 
4. // Trust T is calculated every 60 seconds 
5. // get the data from the watchdog regarding the successful transmission 
every 20 seconds 
6. //𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡 → 𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑆𝑓𝑓𝐶𝑓𝐶𝑆 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆  //𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑡 → 𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑆𝑓𝑓𝐶𝑓𝐶𝑆 𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠 
7. 𝑓𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑒 𝑠𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑆𝑛 𝑏𝑆𝐶𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑛 𝑁 𝑓𝑛𝑁 𝑁𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑖,  𝑏ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑆 1 ≤ 𝑓 ≤ 𝐶 
8. 𝑓𝑆𝑛𝑆 𝐸𝐶𝑓𝑁𝑆𝑛𝑆𝑆_𝑆𝑓𝑓𝑆(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠,  𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆)  
9. {    𝑓𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑒 𝑇 𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑠{ 
10. 𝑓𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑒 𝐶 𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑠 { 
11. 𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑡 = 𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑡 + 𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠                    
12. 𝑆ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑒(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆 > 𝑇ℎ2&&𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆 < 𝑇ℎ1) //Th1>Th2 
13. 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡 = �14 × 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡� + 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆 //penalty 
14. 𝑆𝐶ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑓𝑠𝑆 
15. 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡 = 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡 + 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆 }  } }   
16. 𝐸𝑛𝑁 
 
Figure 3 Screenshot of network simulator (network setup). 
4.1 Proposed Beta Probabilistic Density Function-based Trust 
Model 
This Beta probabilistic density function-based trust model depends on evidence 
collected by the Watchdog mechanism by counting the successful and failed 
transactions in promiscuous mode. Eq. (1) shows the formula for the initial trust 
value in each sensor node. 
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 𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑠𝐶 𝑉𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆 𝑇(𝑛𝑆𝑁𝑆) = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆+1
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆+𝐹𝐹𝑖𝐹𝑆𝐹𝑆+2
         (1)  
Usually, the trust value of the sensor nodes using the above equation will be 
between 0 and 1. Positive 1 is added to the numerator part and a positive 2 is 
added to the denominator part to convey the assumption that in order to assess 
the trust value of a particular sensor node, at least two transactions should take 
place. This equation is reliant upon the Laplace law. Thus, every sensor node is 
initialized with trust value 0.5. However, every sensor node is monitored in 
promiscuous mode and updated often. Instead of transmitting every updated 
value, the current updated value can be transmitted every T seconds to 
overcome the problem of bottleneck and overhead in low-power devices such as 
the nodes in a WSN. Figure 4 shows the network setup in Network Simulator 2 
(NS2). 
 
Figure 4 Screenshot of network shows the nodes that are not within range. 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑡 represents the total number of cumulative successful transactions and  
𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡 represents the total number of cumulative failed transactions at T 
seconds. 
 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑆𝑛 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑜𝐹𝑜 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑡               (2) 
 𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑆𝑛 =  𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑜𝐹𝑜 +  𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡          (3) 
The newly observed data are stored in the sensor node, where space for holding 
new values may not be supported in all cases. A separate solution has to be 
found for storing the old data. The ‘history factor’ concept is introduced to 
overcome this problem. Here, β gives the updated trust value from each sensor 
node’s history. Usually the value of β lies between 0 and 1. 
 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑜𝐹𝑜 = ∑ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑇 × 𝛽(𝑘−𝑇)𝑘𝑇=1  (4) 
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 𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑜𝐹𝑜 = ∑ 𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇 × 𝛽(𝑘−𝑇)𝑘𝑇=1   (5) 
4.2 Decision-making based on Trust Value 
Decisions are made by means of the above trust value through Watchdog 
mechanism and the Beta probabilistic density function. Separate counters for 
both success and failure are set and captured with a trust variable using the Beta 
probabilistic density function to check with a specified threshold value. The 
threshold is represented by θ, which is compared with the manipulated trust 
value before transmitting any packet. If the trust value is greater than the 
threshold value, then the packet can be transmitted since this node is considered 
cooperative and non-selfish, i.e. it is trusted. If the trust value is smaller than the 
threshold value, then the corresponding node is marked as a selfish node. 
Further transactions are not allowed with this particular node. Instead, the 
packets are rerouted to a neighboring node using the routing protocol. 
4.3 Updating the Information to Other Nodes 
Once a node has been categorized as selfish or malicious, the afflicted node 
disconnects the link and triggers the routing process to find a disjoint route. 
Also, the detection of the selfish node is communicated to both the source node 
and the sink via a disjoint route. 
5 Energy Consumed by Beta Density Function Model 
In the proposed Beta density function model, all sensors are observed and their 
trust values are manipulated. The core module (microprocessor) consumes some 
energy for transferring and retrieving the observed data to and from the memory 
module and some power is utilized by the analog to digital converter. Usually, 
most of the power is used for radio communication. Ahmed, et al. [15] 
emphasize that the power used for extra operations, incorporated along with the 
already existing modules, also needs to be considered. Protocols should be 
carefully designed in such a way that embedded operations do not consume 
extra power. In the proposed model, an energy model is implanted along with 
the configuration of the nodes. In most of today’s sensors, the energy is 
renewed with the help of solar cells.  
Figure 5 shows one of the output files (trace file) of the NS-2 simulator, where 
the energy consumed by each node before and after transmission has been 
captured. Malicious nodes are automatically disconnected from the route, 
depending on their trust value. The experimental results showed that less energy 
is used to calculate the trust value and to disconnect untrusted nodes from the 
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routing path. Figure 6 shows various components in the sensor nodes, i.e. the 
power unit, the memory unit and the processing unit. 
 
Figure 5 Screenshot of trace file in NS2 showing the trust calculation in each 
node. 
 
Figure 6 Sensor architecture. 
5.1 Pros and Cons of the Beta Density Function Model 
This section examines the pros and cons of the Beta density function model. 
Pros: it is a very flexible mathematical model and it is simple to use since it is 
statistical. It uses both the behavior and the feedback of the sensor nodes. Cons: 
the Beta probabilistic density function suffers from heterogeneity, indicated by 
using two parameters, α and β. It is easier to use a single parameter instead of 
two. Certain security issues associated with this preprocessing module, need to 
be addressed, for example collision and power constraints. 
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5.2 Issues in the detection phase 
Deciding the threshold value demands more attention. Generally, the threshold 
value is tailored by the application. If the network handles sensitive data, then 
the threshold value ought to be set to 0.95. Hence, if a sensor node drops 10 
packets out of 100 packets, the node is considered untrusted and further packets 
are rerouted. 
If the application is not too sensitive or a safety-critical application, then the 
threshold value can be varied between 0.5 and 0.7. The total number of packets 
dropped by each sensor node is calculated using Eq. (7). 
 𝑇𝑡𝑜𝑡𝐹𝐹 = �𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜+1−�𝜃∗(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜+2)��𝜃               (7) 
However, the ultimate aim is to reduce the total number (𝑇𝑡𝑜𝑡𝐹𝐹) of the drop in 
packets. This 𝑇𝑡𝑜𝑡𝐹𝐹 is used to maintain or update the θ value, because over a 
period of time an internal attacker may gain control or predict the threshold θ 
value. This control takeover is enough to turn a normal sensor node into a 
selfish node, which is prevented by varying θ depending on the number of 
transactions that this particular sensor node makes.  
If a sensor node drops a packet, it is not a normal node, because in a sensor 
network the nodes are supposed to forward all of the packets they receive. Thus, 
this node could be under control of an internal attack. Another cause could be a 
faulty node. As mentioned by Chen et al. in [16], if there is continuous dropping 
of packets by a node, the trust value gets automatically updated in order to 
punish it and reduce its functionality by decrementing the trust level, as given 
by Eq. (8). 
 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑆𝑛 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑜𝐹𝑜 ∗ 𝛽 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑡         (8) 
 𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑆𝑛 = 𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑜𝐹𝑜 ∗ (1 − 𝛽) + 𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡         (9) 
Here, the value of variable β lies between 0 and 0.45. The maximum trust value 
is 0.75. The focus of this study was on identification of selfish nodes rather than 
increasing its trust value. 
5.3 Algorithm for Punishing Continuous Packet Droppers  
1. Begin 
2. Initialize 𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝 as 1 
3. Initialize trust update value β to 0.9 
4. Calculate the latest trust value 
5. 𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑠𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑡 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡+𝐹𝐹𝑖𝐹𝑆𝐹𝑆𝑡 
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6. Check whether the calculated 𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑠𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑡 is smaller than threshold value θ. 
Then do the following  
7. 𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝 =  𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝 ∗ 3; 
8. 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑜𝐹𝑜 =  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑜𝐹𝑜/𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝; 
9. Check if 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑜𝐹𝑜 is less than 0.1, then 𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝 = 1; 
10. 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑆𝑛 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑜𝐹𝑜 ∗ 𝛽 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑡 
11. 𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑆𝑛 = 𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑜𝐹𝑜 ∗ (1 − 𝛽) + 𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡 
12. Calculate the total overall trust using  
 𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑠𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑡𝐹𝐹 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑛+1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑛+𝐹𝐹𝑖𝐹𝑆𝐹𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑛+2 
13. Calculate the total overall trust with a penalty 
 𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑠𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑡𝐹𝐹 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑛+3𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑛+𝐹𝐹𝑖𝐹𝑆𝐹𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑛+4 
The proposed model was experimentally tested using NS2. The number of 
sensor nodes varied from 26 to 60 nodes in order to check the correctness of the 
proposed model. The proposed model was compared with other recent models 
to prove its efficiency. 
In the simulation setup, total number of sensor nodes was varied and the 
corresponding sink nodes were established. In this scenario, every sensor node 
in the network is equipped with the Watchdog mechanism, mainly to keep 
watch of the neighboring nodes by enabling promiscuous mode. Two kinds of 
attacks were simulated to check how our mechanism performed with 26 nodes 
and 60 nodes. Some of the nodes were set as selfish nodes that drop all 
incoming packets,  thus launching a black hole attack as described by Otoum, et 
al. [17]. Another selfish node dropped only certain packets and showed 
dynamic behavior. This type of packet dropping is known as selective 
forwarding or a gray-hole attack. 
Various trust updating models proposed by Che, et al. [2] were compared with 
the proposed model. The proposed model provides a simple and flexible 
solution and improves the lifetime of the network. Also, throughput is increased 
in the presence of a malicious node. Rerouting can be done by avoiding such 
nodes using the proposed trust mechanism.  
Table 1 Trust value variation with time variation (seconds). 
Time (in 
seconds) 
Trust Value of Proposed 
Beta Model (Modified) 
Bayesian 
Model 
Entropy 
Model 
500 0.9396 0.9676 0.9558 
1000 0.4545 0.6601 0.8608 
1500 0.2030 0.5142 0.6298 
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In Table 1, the trust value of a particular selfish node can be seen falling below 
the threshold value (0.5) with the proposed method, while with the other two 
models it still stayed above the threshold value.   
6 Conclusion 
Consecutive failure of packet sending (continuous packet dropping) is not 
addressed in any of the available trust models. Our proposed model is simple to 
implement and effective in safety-critical systems because it can find selfish 
sensor nodes irrespective of their dynamic behavior and reroute packets through 
a disjoint route. Our experimental result showed an improvement of efficiency 
compared with the original Beta reputation model and the Entropy trust model. 
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